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Abstract
The Ukraine power grid cyberattacks remind us that the smart Internet of Things (IoT) can help us control
our light-bulbs, but if under attacks it might also take us into darkness. Nowadays, many literatures have tried to
address the concerns on IoT security, but few of them take into consideration the sever threats to IoT coming from
the advances of quantum computing. As a promising candidate for the future post-quantum cryptography standard,
lattice-based cryptography enjoys the advantages of strong security guarantees and high efficiency, which make it
extremely suitable for IoT applications. In this paper, we summarize the advantages of lattice-based cryptography
and the state of art of their implementations for IoT devices.
Index Terms
Internet of Things, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Lattice-Based Cryptography, Encryption, Digital Signatures,
Constrained Devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Thanks to the Internet, we are now living in the global village where emails from the U.S. can be transmitted
to China within a tenth of second, and real-time teleconferences connect people all over the world. The Internet
of Things (IoT) goes even further beyond, not only affecting the way we exchange data, but also touching the
physical world. Fig. 1 shows some scenarios where devices connected to IoT has changed our living: the smart
household appliances in our homes, the wearable gadgets accompany us everyday, the autonomous vehicles, and
the industrial control system. In the not too distant future, it would be almost impossible to buy new devices that
are not connected to the IoT. And it is estimated that IoT technologies will have an impact of several trillions to
the global economy by 2020 [1].
However, the security and privacy concerns on IoT are always clouds hanging upon us. As pointed out by Bruce
Schneier [2], a security technologist at Harvard University and the chief technology officer of IBM Resilient, the
IoT companies are rushing to make their products cheaper and smarter, but without much care about security. The
Ukraine power grid cyberattacks remind us that the smart IoT can help us control our light-bulbs, but if under
attacks it might also take us into darkness. Nowadays, many literatures have tried to address the concerns on IoT
security [3], but few of them take into consideration the sever threat to IoT coming from the advances of quantum
computing.
Although quantum computers bear some debates over scientists, with the ever-looming breakthroughs of quantum
computing, many researchers are becoming more and more positive about the future of large-scale quantum com-
puters. In March 2017, IBM launched an industry-first initiative, called the IBM Q system, to build a commercially
available universal quantum computing system for business and science applications. The publicly available universal
quantum processor consists of 15 qubits and their commercially available 17-qubit processor is claimed to be at
least twice as powerful.
The quantum threats to cryptography apply equally, or even to a greater extent, to smart objects extensively
used in smart IoT services since they involve platforms and systems which are difficult to update. For example,
embedded devices in wearables and furnitures are difficult to update and the scalability issue in IoT devices further
complicates the problem. Therefore, we should taken into consideration post-quantum security when designing
secure architectures and systems for smart IoT, now.
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Fig. 1: Illustration of smart IoT applications.
Recently, Cheng et al. has called the attention to using post-quantum cryptography (PQC) to secure IoT [4].
As a promising candidate for the future PQC standard, lattice-based cryptography enjoys the advantages of strong
security guarantees and high efficiency, which make it extremely suitable for IoT applications. In this paper, we
focus on introducing the advantages of lattice-based cryptography and the state of art of their implementations for
IoT devices.
In the following, we first give a brief introduction to cryptography and the impact of quantum computers. Then
we explain why lattice-based cryptography is a proper choice for smart IoT. Next we give detailed discussions
on the state-of-art implementations of lattice-based cryptography on constrained devices, following a high-level
overview of lattice based cryptography. Finally we share our opinion on current challenges and directions for future
explorations regarding the application of lattice-based cryptography in IoT systems.
II. CRYPTOGRAPHY AND QUANTUM COMPUTERS
Beneath all security protocols, cryptography is used as a fundamental building block. The canonical implication
of security is confidentiality, which requires that sensitive information can not be learned by unauthorized party.
Symmetric encryption is the simplest and the most popular way of achieving confidentiality. Two communicating
parties, Alice and Bob, share a common secret key which is used for both encryption and decryption. Without the
knowledge of the secret key, a third party can not learn the encrypted information from the ciphertext.
Symmetric encryption requires a shared common key between two parties, which belongs to the area of symmetric-
key cryptography. One drawback of symmetric-key cryptography is the difficulty of establishing secret keys. This is
usually done via some costly secure channels such as face-to-face meeting, use of trusted courier or even quantum
key distribution. These methods are highly difficult and expensive. Asymmetric-key cryptography (aka public-key
cryptography) can be used to overcome this difficulty as it provides a mechanism to distribute cryptographic keys
over insecure channel. In public-key cryptography, Alice has a pair of related keys: one is the private key and the
other is called the public key. The private key, as suggested by its name, is kept private to Alice herself while her
public key is known to everyone.
Using public-key encryption algorithms, everyone can encrypt message and send it to Alice using her public key.
But only Alice who has the private key is able to decrypt. This feature allows Bob to encrypt a secret session key of
a symmetric encryption scheme such as AES and transmit it to Alice. After decrypting, Alice gets the key for AES
and can now establish a secure channel with Bob via AES using the session key. This is called hybrid encryption
and is used in many security protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. Another method known
as the key exchange protocol allows Alice and Bob to negotiate session key over an insecure channel.
Yet another problem arises. How can Bob, or anyone, make sure that the claimed public key for Alice indeed
belongs to Alice but not Eve? This involves the notion of trust in cryptography. Generally two solutions are available.
One is to use the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and the other is to use Identity Based Encryption (IBE).
3PKI is a mechanism that can bind the public keys with the identities of their owners. A trusted certificate
authority (CA) can issue certificate to an entity to prove that the public key indeed belongs to this entity. Informally
a certificate can be viewed as a digital signature made by the CA (using its private key) on the message that “This
public key belongs to Alice”. A digital signature of a message is a digital counterpart to the hand-written signature
which assures that the message is generated by the signer (this relates to authentication in cryptography). Everyone
can use the CA’s public key to verify the validity of the CA’s signature so as to verify the certificate. Of course as
CA is trusted, its public key must be well known. This can be easily achieved since trusted CAs (like government
agencies or global organizations) usually have large influence and rich resources to distribute their public keys to
the public.
The other method of using IBE also requires a trusted authority to generate the public and private key pair of
an entity. But no certificate is needed. In an IBE system, the public key of an entity can be anything so an entity
can use its identity, such as name of an organization, email address of a person, as its public key which can be
easily verified by others. The PKI mechanism requires users to verify each certificate issued by CAs. Thus heavy
public-key operations are needed in PKI, which are obviously not friendly to IoT applications. IBE can efficiently
reduce the cost to verify the correctness of public keys, which turns to be favorable in the scenario of IoT.
Modern cryptography bases its security on rigorous proofs for assuring security in extreme adversarial situations.
The acknowledged security of essentially all provably secure cryptographic primitives is reduced to the confidence on
well-established hardness of some mathematical problems. The integer factorization problem and (Elliptic Curve)
discrete logarithm problem are two famous problems of this kind. They are the bases for RSA, Diffie-Hellman
and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which are widely used in today’s cryptography. The best known classical
algorithms (on Turing machines) for solving factorization and discrete logarithm problem work with sub-exponential
time complexity. But Shor’s quantum algorithm can solve both within polynomial time. A direct consequence is
that once large-scale quantum computers are available our current public-key cryptography system such as RSA
and ECC, would be completely broken. Hence, it is of high priority that we explore alternative problems which are
intractable for both classical computers and quantum computers.
Another mild yet universally influential impact of quantum computing techniques comes from Grover’s algorithm
which presents a quadratic speedup for searching problems over classical algorithms. Grover’s algorithm can be
used for many cryptanalysis methods which require some sort of brute force. For example guessing the secret key
of AES can be accelerated using Grover’s algorithm. Generally speaking, one can simply double the length of the
key to achieve the same post-quantum security level regarding the impact of Grover’s algorithm.
The quantum threat has been well recognized by government agencies, large corporations and academic re-
searchers all over the world. The alternative solution called PQC, which aims to provide cryptographic solutions
those remain secure even the adversary has access to large-scale quantum computers, is now a hot and steadily
growing topic. National Security Agency (NSA) announced, in 2015, their preliminary plans for transitioning to
quantum resistant cryptography for protecting classified information. In December 2016, National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology (NIST) issued an open call for standardization consideration of post quantum cryptographic
algorithms. At the time of writing (December 2017), the open call is finished. NIST is arranging the first PQC
standardization conference, to be held in April, 2018, for the submitters to present and discuss their submissions.
Currently Google is experimenting post-quantum cryptography in its web browser Chrome. The Tor (a software
which protects its users against Internet surveillance) project is also trying to implement lattice-based key exchange
protocols to achieve post-quantum security.
III. WHY LATTICE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY?
Different proposals have been proposed to achieve post-quantum security including hash-based signatures, code-
based cryptography, multi-variate polynomial-based cryptography, and lattice-based cryptography. We focus on
lattice-based cryptography in this article. In our opinion, lattice-based cryptography is highly suitable for smart
IoT applications. Firstly, the strong security guarantees and high efficiency shown by lattice-based cryptography
make it extremely suitable for IoT applications. Secondly, the wide applicability of lattice-based cryptography can
accommodate further advances of smart IoT services. Last but not least, lattice-based cryptography receives the
most intensive attention among all subfields of post-quantum cryptography. The recent NIST call has received 82
submissions for post-quantum cryptographic algorithms and 28 of them are based on lattice, taking the lead.
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Fig. 2: Illustration of a 2-Dimensional lattice
Lattice-based cryptography has strong security guarantees. The underlying hard problems are intensively studied
for decades but no efficient algorithm, both classically and quantumly, is known for those problems. Moreover,
lattice-based cryptography enjoys worst-case to average-case reduction. Cryptography inherently requires average-
case intractability considering the requirement of random keys. The worst-case to average-case reduction essentially
guarantees that lattice-based cryptography is secure on average unless every instance of the underlying lattice
problem is easy. From the practical aspect, this worst-case reduction makes parameter selection and key generation
much easier in lattice-based cryptography. For example, the RSA cryptosystem is based on the hardness of
integer factorization. But this is an worst-case problem. It is known that if the primes have certain number-
theoretic properties, the problem turns out to be essentially easy. Hence it is important to avoid such structures
in key generation for RSA. Unfortunately, we do not know whether such structures have been fully explored. In
contrast, lattice-based cryptography is based on average-case hard problems. When generating keys for lattice-based
cryptography, one only needs to select proper parameter size and then generate keys uniformly.
Lattice-based cryptographic algorithms operate over relatively smaller integers, compared with large integers
used in RSA. The computations involved in the state of art of lattice-based algorithms mainly consists of simple
operations between matrices and vectors in some rings or fileds of small order. Actually lattice-based cryptography
runs faster than RSA and it can be implemented on low-power devices with 8-bit microcontrollers. Recent imple-
mentations of lattice-based cryptography have been already an order of magnitude faster than the corresponding
RSA implementations. For example, the current state-of-art implementation of R-LWE based encryption on 8-bit
AVR microconstroller can finish an encryption within 2 million cycles, while the RSA-1024 (has a lower level of
security and no post-quantum security) implementations on comparable devices need more than 23 million cycles
for the same task [5].
Other candidates of post-quantum cryptography, for example the code-based cryptography, may present even better
performance regarding computational efficiency but inevitably require larger sizes for keys and ciphertexts. We stress
that it is the balance among performance metrics, such as key size, ciphertext and signature lengths, computational
efficiency and confidence of security, that make lattice-based cryptography a well fit for IoT applications.
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Fig. 3: Landscape of hard problems in lattice-based cryptography.
IV. AN INTRODUCTION TO LATTICE BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
Since the impact of quantum algorithms is mild for symmetric-key cryptography but devastating for current public-
key cryptography, many efforts have been put forth in the research of PQC to seek for replacement of universally
used cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC. Among them, lattice-based cryptography is a very promising candidate.
See Peikert [6] for a comprehensive survey on lattice-based cryptography.
Lattice-based cryptography is based on the hardness of solving some geometric problems over high-dimensional
lattices, such as the shortest vector problem (SVP) and the closest vector problem (CVP). But these problems are
easy to solve if one has a good basis. A good basis consists of short vectors which are nearly orthogonal, while
a bad basis consists of long vectors which generally point in the same direction. In Fig. 2, the points coloured in
blue are lattice vectors which are integer combinations of the basis B = {v1,v2}. The basis B, colored in red, is
a bad basis and the basis B′, colored in green, is a good basis consisting of almost orthogonal vectors. The SVP is
to find a shortest nonzero vector such as the vector v′
1
. For an arbitrary vector in the space such as the purple point
t, the CVP is to find a lattice vector t′ which is the closest to t. Note that we use 2-dimensional (2D) examples
for easy visualization but SVP and CVP are easy for 2D case. They get (exponentially) harder as the dimension
of lattice grows.
In Fig. 3, we give a landscape of the hard problems in lattice-based cryptography. The above mentioned SVP and
CVP are called worst-case hard problems. This type of problems only guarantee that there exist instances that are
intractable. But the problem might be easy on average. One big advantage of lattice-based cryptography is that there
are many average-case problems such as the short integer solution (SIS) and learning with errors (LWE) problems.
These are well encapsulated average problems enjoying a worst-case to average-case reduction which states that
SIS and LWE are hard on average (for a random instance) unless the related problems on lattices are easy for all
instances. The worst-case to average-case reduction gives the lattice-based cryptography a easy way to construct
cryptographic schemes and prove their security. That is, one can work on the conceptually simple average-case
problems to construct cryptographic primitives while at the same time gains confidence about the constructions
from the low-level hard lattice problems in the worst case.
The SIS and LWE problems can be easily described in the form of solving linear equation systems. The SIS
problem is to find short nontrivial (excluding the all-zero solutions) integer solutions to an homogeneous linear
system with the coefficient matrix uniformly randomly generated. The LWE problem asks to find the the secret
vector s, given polynomially many samples As + e, where A is a uniformly generated matrix and e represents
the noises selected from some specified error distribution. More compact ring versions of SIS and LWE are called
Ring-SIS (R-SIS) and Ring-LWE (R-LWE). These ring variants can reduce memory requirement and computational
costs for the cryptographic schemes.
In practice, besides the primitives based on (R-)SIS and (R-)LWE, NTRUEncrypt is a lattice-based encryption
scheme standardized by the industry. The security of NTRUEncrypt is based on hard problems over the so called
NTRU lattices. Although there is no worst-case reduction for standard NTRUEncrypt, it has withstood attacks for 20
years (with update in the parameters). Another problem called learning with rounding (LWR) is a derandomization
of LWE, where no error distribution is needed to boost the performance of related schemes.
6V. IMPLEMENTATIONS OF LATTICE-BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR RESOURCE-CONSTRAINED DEVICES
The ambition of connecting everything inherently raises the challenge of implementing cryptographic algorithms
on resource-constrained devices such as sensors and actuators. In this section we review the state of art of implemen-
tations of lattice-based cryptography on constrained devices, which can be divided into software implementations
on microcontrollers and hardware implementations on FPGAs.
Main operations of lattice-based cryptographic constructions involve matrix-vector multiplication (schemes based
on SIS and LWE) and polynomial multiplications (schemes based on R-SIS, R-LWE, and NTRU). Polynomial
multiplication used in R-LWE based schemes can be optimized via the number theoretic transform (NTT) method,
which is a discrete Fourier transform (DFT) variant. In NTT, the primitive root of unity modulo an integer N is
used instead of complex roots of unity used in DFT. The NTT can transform the classic polynomial multiplication
to point-wise multiplication to reduce the complexity from quadratic to quasi-linear. The underlying algorithm can
be adjusted to reduce the number of necessary NTT transformations as suggested by Roy et al. for the R-LWE
based encryption [7]. Optimization methods for FFT can also be borrowed.
Many lattice-based cryptographic constructions (LWE and R-LWE based) require sampling from discrete Gaussian
distribution [8]. There are many methods to implement the discrete Gaussian sampler including rejection sampling,
cumulative distribution table (CDT) sampling, Bernoulli sampling and Knuth-Yao sampling. Sampling from a
discrete Gaussian is difficult due to the fact that it requires high precision computation of the exponential function
or large precomputed tables.
In the following we discuss implementations of lattice-based proposals for public-key encryption, digital signatures
and key exchange protocols. We summarize the implementations on low-cost microcontrollers in Table I, in which
the ‘/’ within a cell is used to separate figures for two different operations in the underlying algorithm. The two
operations are encryption and decryption for public-key encryption schemes; signing and verification for signature
schemes; sever-side computation and client-side computation for key exchange protocols. The ‘ROM’ presents the
memory used by the implementation. The hardware implementations of lattice-based cryptography on FPGAs is
summarized in Table II.
TABLE I: Software implementations of lattice-based cryptography on low-cost microcontrollers.
Schemes Bit Security
Platform
Cycles Time (ms) ROM (KB)
Device CPU MHz
NTRUEncrypt [9] 128 (pre)
Cortex-M0
(XMC1100)
32-bit 32 588,044 / 950,371 18.4 / 29.7 9
R-LWEenc [5]
106 (pre)
46 (post)
ATxmega128 8-bit 32 796,872 / 215,031 24.9 / 6.7 6.5
R-BIN-LWEenc [10] 94 (pre)
ATxmega128 8-bit 32 1,573,000 / 740,000 49.2 / 23.1 2.7
Cortex-M0 32-bit 32 999,000 / 437,000 31.2 / 13.7 5.6
IBE [11] 80 (pre)
Cortex-M0 32-bit 32 3,297,380 / 1,155,000 103.0 / 36.1 17
Cortex-M4 32-bit 168 972,744 / 318,539 5.8 / 1.9 18.7
BLISS [5] 128 (pre) ATxmega128 8-bit 32 10,156,247 / 2,760,244 317.4 / 86.3 18.4
NewHope [15] 128 (post)
Cortex-M0
(STM32F051R8T6)
32-bit 48 1,467,101 / 1,738,922 30.6 / 54.3 30.2
Cortex-M4
(STM32F407VGT6)
32-bit 168 860,388 / 984,761 5.1 / 5.9 22.8
As the first lattice-based encryption scheme, the NTRUEncrypt encryption has been accepted by the IEEE
P1363.1 standard. The NTRU cryptosystem was patented by its inventors along with a variant using ‘product-from
keys’ for efficient implementation. But recently (March, 2017) they announced their decision for placing all of
its NTRUEncrypt patents in the public domain. Recently Guillen et al. [9] explored the feasibility of employing
NTRUEncrypt in constrained devices (a Cortex-M0 based microcontroller).
The R-LWE based encryption scheme is similar to NTRUEncrypt regarding communication and computational
costs. One advantage of R-LWE based encryption is its provable security but it comes at the price of a high-precision
Gaussian sampler. Liu et al. [5] presented a constant-time implementation of the R-LWE based encryption scheme
with 46-bit post-quantum security level on an 8-bit ATxmega128 microcontroller (32 MHz, 128 KB flesh memory, 8
KB RAM) with encryption and decryption time of 24.9 ms and 6.7 ms, respectively. Buchmann et al. [10] proposed
an encryption scheme by replacing the Gaussian noise in R-LWE with a binary distribution and implemented the
scheme (R-BIN-LWEenc) on low-cost microcontrollers.
7TABLE II: Hardware implementations of lattice-based cryptography on FPGAs.
Schemes Bit Security Devices MHz Cycles Time(µs)
R-LWEenc [7] 128 (pre) V6LX75T 313 6,300 / 2,800 20.1 / 9.1
R-LWEenc [12] 128 (pre) S6LX9
144 136,986 946
189 66,338 351
BLISS [14] 128 (pre) S6LX25
129 16,210 126.6
142 9,835 69.3
IBE [11] 80 (pre) S6LX25 174 13,958 / 9,530 80.2 / 54.8
Gu¨neysu and Oder [11] demonstrated that IBE has become practical even for embedded devices such as Cortex-
M microcontrollers and FPGAs by implementing a R-LWE based IBE scheme. Many FPGA implementations
of R-LWEenc exist, we introduce two of them. Roy et al. [7] presented an FPGA implementation of R-LWEenc
optimized for throughput on V6LX75T. Po¨ppelmann and Gu¨neysu [12] presented an area-optimized implementation
of R-LWEenc on S6LX9 by carefully choosing parameters to eliminate modular reduction operations.
We refer the readers to Howe et al. [13] for a comprehensive discussion on lattice-based signatures. Original
proposals for lattice-based signature schemes such as the GGH signature and NTRUSign, which utilize the hardness
of CVP, have been broken. The current state-of-art signature scheme is BLISS, which is based on R-LWE and has
been proven secure in the random oracle model. Discrete Gaussian sampling accounts for more budget in signature
schemes than that in encryption schemes because the deviation used in signature schemes is much larger. State-
of-art software implementation and hardware implementation of BLISS are Liu et al. [5] and Po¨ppelmann et al.
[14]. Ducas proposed a variant called BLISS-B which can reduce the repetition rate and in turn speeding up the
key generation by a factor of 5 to 10.
NewHope is a post-quantum key exchange protocol based on R-LWE and has been used by Google’s post-
quantum security experiments within Chrome. Alkim et al. [15] presented a software implementation of NewHope
for Cortex-M family of 32-bit microcontrollers. With various generic and platform-specific optimizations, their
implementation demonstrated that lattice-based key exchange protocols are indeed promising candidates for post-
quantum IoT security. The Cortex-M0 implementation requires about 1.5 million cycles for server side computation
and 1.8 million for client side. On the more powerful M4 platform the corresponding cycles are 0.8 million and
9.8 million.
VI. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Various implementation results have demonstrated that lattice-based cryptography is practical even for resource-
constrained devices. Regarding computational speed, lattice-based cryptography is already faster than traditional
public-key cryptography such as RSA or even ECC. But one can not draw the conclusion that the former performs
better in practice since lattice based cryptography usually requires more communication cost which is much more
resource-consuming. Further improvement of lattice-based cryptography remains a challenge. The implementation
optimization is of course necessary, but theoretical improvement for reducing ciphertext and signature size might be
more promising. Further directions include tighter security proof, efficient construction, reducing the use of discrete
Gaussian noise and efficient encoding techniques.
Most of implementations we discussed do not provide protection against side-channel attacks (SCAs). It is of
prominent significance to provide side-channel-attack-resistant implementations for smart IoT applications since
they are more venerable to SCAs.
The provable security of most lattice-based cryptography does not guarantee security in practice and might
even cause overlook on practical security. Choosing appropriate parameters for lattice-based schemes is another
challenge. Many incomparable algorithms for analyzing lattice problems are available and the performance for some
of them are not well understood. A unified model for evaluating security level of lattice-based cryptography is highly
desirable. In R-LWE based constructions, the parameters are also constrained by the requirement of NTT-friendly
choices which may lead to gaps in security level.
Analyzing the security of lattice-based cryptography against fully quantum attacks is more than a theoretical
interest. Current PQC only considers the impact of quantum computers (or quantum algorithms). However, in the
8quantum world the attacker is able to have quantum interaction with the cryptosystem. The quantum random oracle
model in the literature is one kind of this directions.
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